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WEBER: REMEDYING THE EFFECTS OF PAST
AND PRESENT DISCRIMINATION
JAMES S. BOWEN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper explores selected ramifications of the benchmark
case, United Steelworkers of America, Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corporation v. Brian Weber, et al.,1 ("Weber"). The
thesis here is that if such evidence as was publicly available had
been presented to the court, there would have been sufficient
ground for the Supreme Court to hold that a case of prior employment discrimination by Kaiser had been proven. In addition, the sociological and legal context of this historic decision is
examined to aid in the determination of the contemporary orientation of this nation toward affirmative action in employment.
To facilitate this examination, the Weber facts are reviewed
to reveal the purpose of affirmative action in the context of employment discrimination. As a result of this process, the basis for
a broader ruling by the Court is shown. Such a ruling would
have more effectively addressed the goals of affirmative action.
Pressure from the conservative school is considered, taking into
account its effects for maintaining the status quo. On the other
hand, the response of the liberal school is evaluated. Altogether,
this review of Weber indicates an uncertain future for affirmative action programs in employment.
The Court chose to decide only one of the issues before it in
Weber: that of the validity under Title VII of voluntary affirmative action efforts. The Court decided to construe away the involuntary aspects of the case. The record presented to the Court
was not congruent to, but was a selectively narrowed subset of,
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; B.A., Ph.D. (Sociology), Columbia University; J.D., Yale Law School; former Chairman, Black Studies Department,
S.U.C.-New Paltz. Appreciation to Professor Drew S. Days III, for his guidance.
1. 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 443
U.S. 193 (1979).

259

HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL

[Vol. II

the full facts of the case. The direct litigating parties in the case
at the trial and appellate levels (Weber, the union and the employer) did not represent the black or other minority beneficiaries of affirmative action. The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission intervened after the appellate decision by filing petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc with the Fifth Circuit. When both of those were denied, a petition for certiorarito
the Supreme Court, and later a brief on the merits were filed.
Based on the absence of direct interest in affirmative action by
the immediate litigants, the parties selectively presented the
facts and doctrinal issues of their case. As a result of this selectivity, the Supreme Court enunciated an unnecessarily and unconscientiously narrow (although otherwise meticulous) standard which covered only "voluntary" efforts, rather than all
affirmative action efforts.

II.

THE FACTS OF WEBER

A.

Overview of the Case

A collective bargaining agreement between union and employer established a job upgrading and training program for
workers without craft experience. Blacks were to be selected
from seniority lists in equal proportion to, but separately from,
whites until the black employee ratio showed parity to the black
percentage of the labor force. The black employee ratio for the
Gramercy, Louisiana plant was only 1.83 percent (5 out of 275
employees) and blacks were more than one-third (39%) of the
area work force.2 Kaiser attributed the low percentage of black
craftworkers to the lack of training opportunities for blacks in
the building trades and craft industries from which Kaiser hired
most of its skilled workers. 3
2. 443 U.S. at 198-99.
3. Appellant Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit at 3, United States and EEOC v. Weber (Supreme Court October
Term 1977) [hereinafter cited as petition for Cert.] Out of joint negotiations between the
union and the employer, a plan developed to increase the percentage of black workers at
the skilled level. The plan was spurred by findings of non-compliance by the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) and Kaiser's attempt to avoid suits for backpay by
black employees. Id. at 3-4, 8, 16 and 18. For a copy of the Petition for Cert. see 112
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CON-
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The master collective bargaining agreement for the Kaiser
industry covered fifteen Kaiser plants, including Gramercy, Louisiana. The agreement between Kaiser and the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) union provided that an in-house
committee composed of both employers and employees would
review minority employment levels and, if warranted, establish
goals and timetables for upgrading the percentage of minorities
in the Gramercy plant's skilled craft workforce. Selection to the
apprenticeship program was to be according to racial classification, one-for-one, with selection from each racial class according
to seniority. Pursuant to the agreement, seven black and six
white craft trainees would constitute the first class at the Gramercy plant." Although these thirteen training positions were filled by persons already employed by Kaiser, the company hired
22 craftsmen from outside the plant of whom 21 were white.'
A class action suit for injunctive and monetary relief was
instituted by Brian Weber, a white who had more seniority than
several of the selected black trainees, alleging that Title VII forbade Kaiser's affirmative action plan because it discriminated
against him and his white colleagues.' The district court and the
court of appeals struck down the affirmative action program because, in their view, trainee selection was based on an impermissible racial classification in violation of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.7 The Supreme Court, taking judicial notice of
traditional segregation "on racial grounds," held that race-conscious plans may be voluntarily adopted by employers to achieve
affirmative action.8
6-13 (Kurland and Casper ed. 1978).
4. Two black employees with three months less seniority than Brian Weber were accepted as skilled craft apprentices, thus providing Weber the alleged basis for his discrimination claim. 443 U.S. at 225 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
5. Petition for Cert. at 5.
6. 443 U.S. at 199-200.
7. Weber, 563 F.2d 216.
8. 443 U.S. at 208-09. The trial court found that Kaiser had never discriminated. 415
F. Supp. at 769. Based on a restitutionary view (i.e., that affirmative action is only available "to restore employees to the positions they would have occupied but for prior discrimination"), the appellate court found that there was no discrimination. 564 F.2d at
224.
sTIrTrONAL LAw
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The Majority

Whether the Congressional intent, as revealed by legislative
history and the language of Title VII, approved or disfavored
the existence of the Kaiser-USWA Plan in Weber is the central
issue which divides the Court. A majority of the Court (J.J.
Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, White and Blackmun) hold that Title VII manifests no intent to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action plans. Finding distinctions in the letter and spirit of
Title VII, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, declares
that a law cannot be read intelligibly outside of the historical
context which produced the law as evidenced by its legislative
history. Constrained by the "plight of the Negro" in our economy, Congress moved to eliminate the barriers between blacks
and their economic competition in the marketplace. Upon a
close review of the rationale and supporting evidence offered
during the debate on the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1964, Justice Brennan finds sufficient justification to hold that Congress
intended to leave open the option of voluntary action aimed at
correcting the present consequences of past racial
discrimination."
Justice Brennan substantiates his assertion that Congress
intended to encourage voluntary affirmative action programs by
quoting the House Report which said that "national leadership
• . .will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local
resolution of other forms of discrimination.1
On the basis of this legislative history, Justice Brennan concludes that Congress did not and could not have intended to
preclude voluntary efforts to ameliorate the consequences of racial injustice:
The very statutory words intended as a spur or catalyst
to cause "employers and unions to self-examine and to
self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor
to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history," . . . cannot be interpreted as an absolute prohibition against all private, voluntary, race-conscious
9. 443 U.S. at 194-95, 203-04.
10. Id. at 204 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963)). (Emphasis
supplied by Justice Brennan).
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affirmative action efforts to hasten the elimination of
such vestiges . ..

.

Justice Brennan's analysis is further reinforced by scrutiny
of the specifically relevant section of Title VII: § 703(j). 2 Opponents of the bill which later became Title VII argued that it
would either require or induce employers to accord preferential
treatment to blacks where racial, imbalance existed in their industrial workforce. However, Justice Brennan finds no justification for such arguments. Section 703(j) prohibits requiring employers to engage in such action; however, since the section does
not provide that "nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted to
permit" voluntary affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances, Justice Brennan emphasizes that the logical inference is
that Congress chose not to disallow all voluntary race-conscious
affirmative action. On the contrary, Justice Brennan declares
that inasmuch as Congress considered the possibility of voluntary affirmative action and consciously chose neither to forbid
nor deny permission for voluntary efforts by employers to redress racial imbalance, the Act as constituted allows such efforts. 3 The compromise represented by § 703(j) of Title VII reflects the concern of some members in the Congress that federal
intrusion into private business might be increased or that "management prerogatives and union freedoms" might be decreased. 4 Therefore, Justice Brennan argues that in adopting
11.

Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
Section 703(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976), provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin of
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin employed by an employer, referred or classified for employment by an employment agency or labor organization, or admitted to, or
employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with
the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex or
national origin in any community, State, section, or other area.
Section 703(j) speaks to substantive liability under Title VII, but it does not preclude
courts from considering racial imbalance as evidence of a Title VII violation. 443 U.S. at
204 n.5.
13. 443 U.S. at 205-06.
14. Id. at 206-07.
12.

264
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§ 703(j) Congress could not have provided for ends inconsistent
with the stated purposes of Title VII as given in its legislative
history. Thus, Congress did not preclude all race-conscious af15
firmative action.
The Kaiser-USWA Plan falls within the permissible area of
affirmative action plans, as it was designed to eliminate traditional segregation and racial hierarchy and to dislodge the barriers which foreclosed blacks' employment possibilities. 16 Further,
the plan neither "trammel[s] the interests of white employees,"
nor requires their discharge,17 nor proffers an absolute bar to
their advancement. It neither erects a permanent structure in
the workplace nor maintains racial balance,'" the latter of which
would violate the Bakke' 9 mandate.2 °
Finding that the program specifies the conditions of its own
demise in the provision that it will be terminated when the proportion of blacks in the Kaiser skilled craft workforce approximates the percentage of blacks in the local labor force and recognizing that the plan includes whites for half its openings, the
majority reverses the lower court and holds that the plan is
clearly within the discretion permitted employers who attempt
to eliminate the conspicuous racial disparity in their workforces.
C. Justice Blackmun's Position
Justice Blackmun shares "some of the misgivings" expressed by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Weber, especially
as to the majority's reading of the legislative history of Title VII.
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun looks to "additional considerations, practical and equitable" which lead to the result
reached by the Weber Court. 21 Quoting Judge Wisdom,2 2 Justice
Blackmun initially characterizes the situation as arising from a
15. Id.
16. Id. at 208-09.
17. Id. at 208; see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)
(where a plan requiring the discharge of white workers in order to hire new black workers was struck down).
18. 443 U.S. at 208-09.
19. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
20. Broderick, The Nature of the Constitutional Process: Equal Protection and the
Burger Court, 12 N.C. CENTR. L. J. 320, 327 (1981). [hereinafter cited as Broderick].
21. 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
22. Weber, 563 F.2d at 227 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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paradox created by the nondiscrimination mandate of Title VII
itself and views the position of the union and employer as on a
"high tightrope without a net beneath them." Justice Blackmun
explains that while blacks are to be redressed for past discrimination, whites may not be put at a disadvantage by the imposition of any measure designed to alleviate the present effects of
past discrimination.2 3 According to Justice Blackmun, without
engendering any liability to whites, Kaiser-type affirmative action: a) avoids identification of, and thereby backpay claims by,
past victims; b) reduces liability to past victims to the extent of
the program's benefits to them; and, c) reduces the probability
that the disparate effect requirement could be satisfied
where it
24
is mandated as a predicate to Title VII liability.
Arguing that Congressional policy may be more effectively
accomplished by constricting the application of Title VII to "arguable violations" rather than the broader target of "traditionally segregated" job categories, Justice Blackmun charges that
the Court adopts an overly broad approach which distorts the
intent of Congress. He suggests that the principle of non-discrimination is abandoned by the majority's unfocused approach
and that targeting traditionally segregated job categories (even
in Louisiana with its history of segregated and inferior trade
schools for blacks, its traditionally all-white craft unions, its
union nepotism and its segregated apprenticeship programs)
would overreach the malady which Congress intended to
25
correct.
However, Justice Blackmun does not rest his analysis on the
way in which the majority departs from the Congressional intent
expressed in Title VII. In a most incisive analysis, Justice Blackmun declares that the majority's broad standard does not violate
the spirit of the Act. First, the majority's measure of discrimination is statistical disparity.2" While such disparity meets the
standard in Dothard v. Rawlinson, it does not surmount the
threshold of Teamsters v. United States. According to Justice
23. 443 U.S. at 209-10.
24. Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 212-13.
26. Id. at 213.
27. Id. The Court stated that "While, under Title VII, a mere disparity may provide
the basis for a prima facie case against an employer, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 443 U.S. 321,
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Blackmun, the practical considerations surpass the theoretical
here: the "arguable violation" approach and the "traditionally
segregated job category" approach produce almost identical results where the arguable violation standard is set sufficiently low
as an indicator to be effective in identifying discrimination. Such
a low threshold for an "arguable violation" approach would subsume most traditionally segregated job categories as measured
by disparate impact.2
Further, based on Hazelwood School District v. United
States2 9 and Teamsters30 analysis, to the degree that claimants
can show that past discrimination creates present disparity, the
majority would allow a comparison of the employer's workforce
(itself possibly reflective of discriminatory impact) with the
larger local work force.3 '
Prodded by the momentum of his analysis, Justice Blackmun declares that "[sitrong considerations of equity support an
interpretation of Title VII that would permit private affirmative
action to reach where Title VII itself does not.
. . Where Title
VII provides no remedy for blacks, it should not be construed to
32
foreclose private affirmative action from supplying relief.
Respondent Weber had argued that the alleged scarcity of
black craftsmen in Louisiana, itself the legacy of historic discrimination, made Kaiser's training program illegal because it
absolved Kaiser from liability under Title VII. Kaiser allegedly
had no hand in the creation or perpetuation of the discriminatory cause. Pinpointing the immense unfairness and illogic of
this argument, Justice Blackmun rejoins that this alleged status
of clean hands does not make Kaiser's program illegal: 3
Absent compelling evidence of legislative intent, I
would not interpret Title VII itself as a means of "locking in" the effects of segregation for which Title VII provides no remedy. Such a construction, as the Court
329-331 (1977), it would not conclusively prove a violation of the Act. Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20; see § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)."
28. 443 U.S. at 213.
29. 443 U.S. at 299, 309-10 (1977).
30. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 and n.20 (1977).
31. 443 U.S. at 213-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 214.
33. Id.
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points out ..
would be "ironic," given the broad reme1 3
dial purposes of Title VII
Justice Blackmun approves the moderate nature of the Kaiser affirmative action plan, noting with the majority that there is
no absolute preference for blacks and that the program is scheduled to terminate "when the racial composition of Kaiser's craft
workforce matches the racial composition of the local population." This finite duration complies with the Bakke mandate
that disallows the maintenance of a previously achieved racial
35
balance.
D.

The Dissents

Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opinion, criticizes the
majority's rewriting of Title VII in Weber and charges the majority with violating the separation of powers principle. Stating
that the majority uses application of the statute in Weber as a
guise for statutory reconstruction, Chief Justice Burger accuses
the majority of usurping powers assigned by the Constitution to
Congress. 6 Like Justice Rehnquist, the Chief Justice sees the
statutory language of Title VII, §§ 703(a) and (d), 7 as clearly
34. Id. at 215.
35. Id. at 215-16 (citing to University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
342 n. 17 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. 443 U.S. at 216-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
37. Sections 703(a) and (d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and (d) (1976) provide:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or to
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(d) Training Programs
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or
other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established
to provide apprenticeship or other training.
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and unambiguously prohibiting racial discrimination in employment. He says that the Kaiser-USWA Plan is exactly
that-racial discrimination. 8
The second dissenting opinion in Weber is fuller and more
detailed. Noting that the Court's decision is anachronistic and
discreditable, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
sardonically recommends that the Orwellian year of 1984 would
give better perspective to the Court's opinion in this case since
that opinion, in their view, is such a volte-face of the Court's
earlier interpretation of Title VII.39 According to Justice Rehnquist, Title VII had previously been read to "prohibit racial discrimination in employment simpliciter."'4 0 Justice Rehnquist argues that under McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,4 1 and
the Court's earlier readings of Title VII based on its "uncontradicted legislative history," the same standards of racial discrimination are applied to black and white alike."
Justice Rehnquist avers that the dispositive determination
and controlling precedent are the Court's several previous utterances that Title VII prohibits discrimination against "each" applicant regardless of race and regardless of the proportion of applicant's race already on the job. Justice Rehnquist accuses the
Court of permitting exactly what the Court says is forbidden:
tramelling the interests of white employees.'"
In the opinion of Justice Rehnquist, "the Court eludes clear
statutory language, 'uncontradicted' legislative history, and uniform precedent" to reach its conclusion that Title VII permits
employers to consider race in making employment decisions.
Even on their respective views of relevant facts, the two
sides of the Court are split. For example, Justice Rehnquist emphatically introduces his factual history of the case by noting
that since "the Gramercy facility had no apprenticeship or inplant craft training program," only persons with previous craft
See 443 U.S. at 199-200.
38. 443 U.S. at 216-17.
39. Id. at 219-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 220.
41. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
42. 443 U.S. at 220.
43. Id. at 221.
44. Id. at 222.
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experience were hired.4 '5 For Justice Rehnquist this practice
would have been tantamount, in an employment discrimination
suit by black plaintiffs, to justification sufficient to satisfy an
employer-defendant's burden to explain the business necessity
of a practice having racially disparate results.
An additional divergence on the Court is reflected in Justice
Rehnquist's comments about the role of the agency charged with
enforcement of equal opportunity regulations:
The OFCC [Office of Federal Contract Compliance]
employs the "power of the purse" to coerce acceptance of
its affirmative action plans. Indeed, in this case, the district court found that the 1974 collective-bargaining
agreement reflected less of a desire on Kaiser's part to
train black craft workers than a self-interest in satisfying
the OFCC in order to retain lucrative government
contracts."
Further, Justice Rehnquist again places the Court's view of
the facts in disfavorable context in his questioning of the validity of characterizing the Kaiser-USWA Plan as temporary and
not designed to maintain racial balance.4 7
Arguing that the Kaiser-USWA Plan is prohibited by the
plain language of Title VII,"8 Justice Rehnquist re-affirms that
he sees "no irony in a law that prohibits all voluntary racial discrimination, even discrimination directed at whites in favor of
4
blacks." 9
E. Evaluating the Opinions
Here, the arguments are succinctly juxtaposed: at the vortex, the majority's affinity for antidiscrimination measures collides with the dissent's approbation of nondiscrimination.
Within this configuration, several questions arise: Can there be
effective redress of societal discrimination with no regard for the
racial identity of its victims and no measure taken to restore
what has been wrongfully denied them? Is it fair to equate the
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 223 n.2.
Id. at 223-24 n.3.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 228 n.10.
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lot of black and white workers, say in 1964 in the Civil Rights
Act, by declaring them as equal now and henceforth, without attempting to make some rectification for past discrimination?
Justice Rehnquist does not answer these questions. In the context of his opinion in Weber, these questions do not exist.
Rather, Justice Rehnquist finds that the majority's averred support for defeating the "plain language" of §§ 703(a) and (d) is
tenuous and read out of the context of H.R. Rep. No. 914, where
the legislative history of Title VII is given.10 Justice Rehnquist's
reading of this legislative history would indicate that Congress
intended only to eliminate "the most serious types of discrimination" against minorities.6 ' This Congressional thrust would
then create the leadership which others would follow--voluntarily and locally.2
In essence, while the majority reads the language of the legislative history expansively, allowing broad rein to the articulated aims of Congress in Title VII, Justice Rehnquist would
truncate these aims and construe most narrowly the stated intentions of the legislature.
Concluding on the discordant note that the majority's legitimation of racial quotas is the sowing of the wind from which
later courts will reap the whirlwind, Justice Rehnquist says that
"[w]hether described as 'benign discrimination' or 'affirmative
action,' the racial quota is nonetheless a creator of castes, a twoedged sword that must demean one in order to prefer
another."5 3
Justice Rehnquist's reading of the legislative history does
not resolve the question of the reach of Title VII in prohibiting
employment discrimination. He points to no explicit prohibition
of voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action.5 ' While he does
advance statements that various Senators had made in the
course of debate on the proposed bill, nowhere can or does he
show definitively that Title VII was designed to prohibit a plan
of the Kaiser-USWA variety. Perhaps Rehnquist's main error is
his failure to distinguish preferential treatment and compensa50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 229-30 n.11. See also note 59 in!ra.
443 U.S. at 229-30 n.11.
at 254.
at 237-43.
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tory treatment. While he suggests repeatedly that Title VII was
designed to correct racial discrimination in employment, nowhere does he show what steps other than nondiscrimination
may be taken to accomplish this specifically articulated purpose
of Title VII.55 Such a myopic view of appropriate remedies in
reverse discrimination suits is misguided. Rather than view the
centuries of discrimination and oppression suffered by minorities as the evil deserving of correction, Justice Rehnquist has
chosen to attack the use of numerical quotas, which has been to
date the only effective means for ending some of the enduring
effects of that discrimination. Justice Rehnquist resurrects the
exhausted argument about the meaning of equality: whether its
essence is equality of opportunity or equality of results. At no
time does he recognize that opportunity may be determinatively
influenced in a capitalist economy by intergenerational transmission of socio-economic advantage. In American society, such
transmission occurs not only for families, but also for racial
groups.
Robert Staples, a black scholar who has analyzed the nature
of the influence of race and racism in American society, suggests
one impact of the intra-racial intergenerational transmission of
advantage." Staples, a primary advocate of the view that blacks
are an oppressed group in a racist society, indicates that race
strongly determines a person's life chances in jobs, housing, education, health "and even life or death." Staples notes that racism
is a justification and "symbol" for oppression which manifests
itself in ghettoization and colonial subjugation. He sees much of
the societal racism as a result of institutional racism, primarily
benefitting the average white citizen by such arrangements (e.g.,
the exclusion of blacks from fair and equal competition in access
to occupations, education, housing, health and life itself). Although Staples defines majority groups as "the collective group
of whites who benefit from minority subordination," he specifies
55. The critical evaluation of Justice Rehnquist's analysis may be taken a step further. Nondiscrimination, for Justice Rehnquist, may be defined as the equal treatment of
majority and minority persons, treatment without regard to race in the employment process. For him, previous discrimination and attempts to correct it have no place in the
endeavor to create equality now- only the present status of an applicant need be examined; the past is simply obliterated.
56. R. STAPLES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BLACK SOCIOLOGY 250 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as STAPLES].
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that this view does not mean that all whites actively discriminate against blacks. Nonetheless, by virtue of black exclusion
from opportunities ... white chances for benefits are automatically increased.
Thus, if parity or at least proportionality is not achieved at
some point in the hiring for jobs requiring a low level of skills
which admittedly some persons from all groups, majority and
minority, could perform, the hiring process should be examined
in detail and modified. Such an examination would inquire into
the causes and consequences of the particular disparity within a
given industry, with an eye toward violations of specific sections
of Title VII, the equal protection clause and the due process
clauses. Indicated modifications would include any of the remedies, legal and equitable, which courts have employed in redressing racial discrimination.
III.

A.

MORE ARGUMENTS

The Legislative History

The argument over the "plain language" of Title VII5 8 as
opposed to the "legislative history" and "historical context" of
the Act is instructive-even if it does not settle the question of
what kinds of affirmative action programs Congress intended to
allow. The argument juxtaposes the plain statutory language
that declared discrimination an unlawful employment practice
against the purpose and spirit of the Act.
The General Statement introducing the Legislative History
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proclaims a broad interdiction of
discrimination in American life.59 Through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) established under Title
VII, Congress envisioned the use of "formal and informal remedial procedures" to eliminate racial discrimination in employ57. J.S. Bowen, Black Student Militance: Campus Unrest Among Black Students,
1968-72, 112-13 (1981) (Ph.D. Dissertation for Columbia University; available in Columbia University Library) [hereinafter cited as Bowen Dissertation].
58. For an opinion which demonstrates that Weber was not the first time the Court
looked beyond the "plain language" of a statute to find its meaning, see NLRB (National
Labor Relations Board) v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 338 U.S. 175 (1967), a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan in which Justice White concurred.
59. H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1964) reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 2393-94 [hereinafter cited as Legislative History 1964].
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ment.60 Enumerated in the Legislative History are the activities
of employers, labor unions and apprenticeship programs which
will constitute unlawful employment practices. When done because of an applicant's or employee's race, these unlawful employment practices include: the failure or refusal to hire; discharge; discrimination in compensation; restrictive and
depriving limitations; segregation or classification of employees;
discrimination against a Title VII grievant or a participant in an
apprenticeship program; and advertisement of racial preferences. 61 Sections 704(a)-705(b) especially support the contention
that the nature and extent of the prohibition against discrimination in employment is broad and comprehensive in the elaboration of unlawful practices. Section 714(b) provides a good faith
defense to employers and other parties who act in reliance on
written statements of the EEOC.
The minority report of the proposed Civil Rights Act of
196362 details the "parade of horribles" which some representatives foresaw as the consequences of passage of the Act.63 Even
from its incipiency, opponents of the bill abortively attempted
to characterize it as a reverse discrimination measure. This cry
of reverse discrimination would prove to be a favorite device of
the opponents of affirmative action into the ensuing decades."
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Legislative History for our purposes here is the evidence presented of the lack
of equal employment opportunity. Tables demonstrating (a)
black and white unemployment rates for 1962, (b) occupational
breakdown of black and white workers for 1948 and 1962, (c)
median earnings for whites and blacks for a 21-year period beginning in 1939 and (d) employment by major occupational
group 1960-75 show, for Congress, the history of discrimination
in employment. 65 The picture presented is one of "overwhelming" evidence of discrimination and "straightjacket" impact."
60. Id. Although the Legislative History names the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), subsequent legislation gave this function to the EEOC.
61. Legislative History 1964 supra note 59, at 2474, § 2401 et seq.
62. Id. at 2431-32.
63. For one listing of the "parade of horribles" consequent to the proposed Act, see
Legislative History 1964, supra note 59, at 2433-34, 2439-41.
64. Id. at 2441.
65. Id. at 2513-14.
66. Id. at 2513-14.
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The economic effect on blacks has been to force a large segment
into "marginal existence" economically. 7 The Report also recognizes the secondary and recurrent effects of economic marginality in generating added costs for "unemployment insurance, relief, disease and crime."6
B. Judge Wisdom's Dissent
Circuit Judge Gee, affirming the district court for the majority in the Fifth Circuit decision, held that there was insufficient
evidence to show employer past discrimination in the Weber
case. Absent such evidence, the quota system violated the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. According to Judge Gee, to the degree that
Executive Order No. 112469 required discrimination, that Order
must necessarily yield to the Congressional mandate against
70
discrimination.
Judge Wisdom dissented, pointing out initially that the majority did not assert that race may never be considered as a factor in employment decisions. The controversy was over whether
the plan instituted by Kaiser Aluminum met the statutory and
constitutional requirements for affirmative action programs. 1
Judge Wisdom indicated "three independent legal justifications" for affirmative action programs like Kaiser's. 72 First, the
plan was negotiated by the employer and the union. Given the
duty of fair representation to both black and white workers and
the fact that the membership majority of the union was white,
union advocacy served as an effective check on any plan's unfairness.7 Second, rather than require the replacement of white
workers to accommodate blacks, the plan correctly applied a
"rightful place" theory which prohibited future discrimination.
Because "entirely new rights were created by the plan," no expectations of white incumbents were disappointed. No white
workers lost their jobs. Rather, all employees were given new expectations by the new plan which allowed both black and white
67.
68..
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 2514.
Id. at 2515.
Section 202(1), 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974).
563 F.2d at 227.
Id. (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
Id. at 228.
Id. at 232-33.
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to be considered. Third, since the program was not exclusively
for blacks, white participation was facilitated; the possibility of
white participation increased the reasonableness of the plan. 4
A fourth justification for the plan, which Judge Wisdom
treated as tangential given the majority's refusal to discuss it at
all, is an employer's decision to compensate victims of societal
discrimination. Finding that Title VII does not require compensation for societal discrimination, Judge Wisdom argued that
neither does it preclude it."' Although some other groups7 6 could
claim that at times they too have been discriminated against in
American society, he observed that their inclusion would eviscerate the effectiveness of affirmative action programs for "blacks,
Latin-Americans, Asian-Americans and women." As presently
victimized groups, persons from these backgrounds would "start
behind the other competitors" in any employment situation."
Further, according to Judge Wisdom, Executive Order
11246 serves as justification for upholding the Kaiser program.
In support of this proposition, Judge Wisdom indicated that
Congress distinguished Executive Order programs from judicial
remedies for proven discrimination. Hence, arguably, Executive
Order program plans would not need to meet the requirement of
such court-ordered plans.7 8
Judge Wisdom recognized that the use of race as a consideration to achieve an end to racial discrimination is "perilously
close to self-contradiction. 1 7 9 In essence, his dissent is an eloquent and forceful statement supporting the validity of affirmative action programs of the Kaiser model.
IV.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONTEXT: UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES

OF THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REMEDY IN WEBER

The theory of unanticipated consequences of goal-oriented
social behavior suggests that the effects of certain actions are
unrecognized and considered improbable. The theory points to
74. Id. at 234.
75. Id. at 235.
76. Id. In this category, Judge Wisdom specifies "Americans of Irish, Italian, Jewish
or German extraction."
77. Id.
78. Id. at 237-38.
79. Id. at 239.
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the displacement of ends phenomenon where unintended outcomes are substituted for intended goals.8 0 This theory signals
the importance of the lack of motivation by the parties before
the lower courts in Weber to present evidence of discrimination.8 1 Since it was not to the advantage of any of the parties to
the litigation at the trial or appellate levels to document past
discrimination, such evidence as existed was not offered.
There were distinct reasons for the union, the company and
Weber himself to omit or avoid a showing of prior racial discrimination at Kaiser-Gramercy. A showing of present or past discrimination against blacks would have weakened Weber's case,
since his claim was that the extant racial discrimination was
against him and other whites qua whites. Since a majority of
union members were white, it would not have been in their interests to produce evidence supporting the thesis of past discrimination and thereby mitigating the legality (and morality) of
their status quo positions. For the employer, it would have been
especially disadvantageous to adduce evidence of past discrimination because such proof would leave Kaiser subject to suits by
those discriminated against for back pay and other statutory
remedies.2
Evidence of discrimination not considered by the trial court
includes census data: the high unemployment rate of blacks as
compared to whites in Louisiana-9.5% black unemployed;
4.7% white unemployed (Year 1960) and discrepancy in median
income.8
Kaiser's most implausible argument-that it never discriminated-was not challenged. Nonetheless, there were several bases for asserting such a challenge. Among these were Kaiser's
five-year prior experience requirement, typically fulfilled by
work in the building trades-an industry known for its rampant
discrimination. Others include the disparity in racial proportions
80. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 Am.
Soc. REV. 894, 895-904 (1936).
81. The Department of Justice, the EEOC and the Department of Labor were not
parties in the lower courts. They entered as intervenors or litigating amici subsequent to
the appellate court decision.
82. Comment, The Distorted Adversarial Posture of Title VII Affirmative Action
Challenges, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 1543, 1549 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The
Distorted Adversarial Posture].
83. Id. at 1550.
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between workforce and labor pool; and the reviews of the
Atomic Energy Commission detailing the racially "disparate impact" of Kaiser hiring. All of these suggest illegal, post-Act (Title VII) discrimination. They further show that prior to the establishment of the affirmative action plan minority applicants
were not considered for hiring."
In sum, evidence of discrimination did exist. If this evidence
had been given its due probative value, the lower courts would
have found the Kaiser affirmative action program sufficiently
justified as a remedy for past racial discrimination. Furthermore,
the evidence would support a broader statement by the Supreme
Court, holding that discrimination on these facts of Weber
would have justified both voluntary and involuntary affirmative
action programs."
Although the Weber holding was limited to private employers by the Supreme Court, decisions in subsequent cases by
lower courts have extended the Weber principles to the public
sector. While pre-Title VII discrimination may be considered in
a challenge to an affirmative action plan, if post-Title VII discriminatory actions can be proved the court may not recognize
the narrow restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court on the
extent of the Weber holding.8 6 In addition, subsequent to the
announcement of Weber, several courts have explicitly cited
Weber in support of their decisions supporting affirmative action
87
programs.
Where evidence of specific employer past discrimination exists, the standard of proof should not require evidence of category-wide discrimination in a suit against a single employer.
However, some interpretations of Weber would require specific
84. Id. at 1554.
85. While such a broad holding may have been somewhat redundant for constitutional purposes, given other holdings supporting involuntary affirmative action, the leadership potential of the broad holding will become apparent when it is given preclusive
effect in future cases similar to Weber.
86. See Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 938 (1981).
87. See Maehren v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 480, 599 P.2d 1255 (Wash. 1979)
(upholding a Seattle Fire Department program); Tangren v. Wackenhut Services, Inc.,
480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979) (upholding a voluntary program); Price v. Civil Service
Commission of Sacramento County, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 604 P.2d 1365, (Cal. S. Ct. 1980);
Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh, 488 Pa. 470, 412 A.2d 860 (Pa. S. Ct. 1980).
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employer past discrimination.8 8 Nonetheless, where no evidence
of specific discrimination was shown within a category but where
evidence of specific employer discrimination was found, Weber
has been cited as authority for upholding a voluntary affirmative
action plan. 89
The question is sufficiently clear: is it not disproportionate
to require categorical (throughout a particular job within an industry) discrimination when there is sufficient proof that a specific employer has discriminated-especially when the proposed
remedy is merely and only to correct the direct injury caused by
that employer's discriminatory actions? Why should not a requirement of industry-wide or occupation-wide proof of discrimination suggest an analogously industry-wide or occupation-wide
remedy? New industries, such as the computer industry, which
have expanded their job categories since the Act, may present
great difficulty for a petitioner claiming discrimination to show
"traditional segregation" in their relatively new job categories.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Supreme
Court did not go as far as it could have in addressing the Kaiser
Aluminum affirmative action plan. However, those on the other
side of the issue argue that the Court went too far. To be sure,
Weber arguably addressed more than the applicability of Title
VII to the plan. Nonetheless, given the extent of discrimination
extant at the plant, there were constitutional principles which
were applicable not only in the Weber situation, but also to
other remedies for discrimination including consent decrees,
court-ordered affirmative action and public employment. One
such principle is embodied in the argument that the Weber plan
constituted unlawful state action in its hiring preference for minority persons. The counterargument is that the government
had long been a party to the discrimination which the plan was
designed to correct. Further scrutiny of these arguments as related to the principle of state action provides one illustration of
the applicability of the Constitution to the issue.
88.

See Comment, The Distorted Adversarial Posture, supra note 82, at 1546 n. 19

and text.
89. Mann, Civil Procedure v. Civil Rights: The Plight of the Claimant in Employment Discrimination Cases, 11 U. WEST L.A. L. Rav. 69, 72 (1979).
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THE "STATE ACTION" ARGUMENT

One analyst observes that "Weber did not seriously pursue
a cause of action under the fifth amendment of the Constitution."0 As part of his thesis that an equal protection requirement operates against what he sees as the "reverse discrimination" of the training plan in Weber, he would assert that the
fifth amendment would bar race-conscious affirmative action
which operates unequally for whites. "No person shall . . . be

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
As a basis for his interpretation, the analyst cites a
companion case to Brown 1,92 Bolling v. Sharpe,93 holding that
"..

racial segregation in the District of Columbia school system was
outlawed because of the unconstitutional deprivation of liberty
of black school children.94 Hence, the analyst, as do many who
champion the arguments of reverse discrimination, wishes to use
the very same principles as supported civil rights to argue that
the only possibly effective strategy for diminution of employment discrimination discovered to date in America might be
used to limit (what is in the view of many blacks) the exiguous
economic progress of Black Americans. While the Supreme
Court did not consider the implications of the fifth amendment
in Weber, the analyst proposed that an examination of the facts
of Weber invokes a fifth amendment-equal protection challenge
to the decision in Weber. According to this view, inasmuch as
the OFCC, the EEOC and the NLRB's (National Labor Relations Board) involvement with the USWA induced Kaiser to
generate and initiate the Gramercy Plan, state action may be
said to be present in Weber. The analyst attempts to posit, in
his view, a stronger case of state action when he notes that Congress did not "specifically authorize" the Weber plan, which
would insulate it from the special protection accorded Congressionally-authorized plans. 95 Under each of the various criteria
90. Note, The Presence of State Action in United Steelworkers v.Weber, 6 DUKE L.
J. 1172 (1980) [hereinafter cited as State Action].
91. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
92. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
94. State Action, supra note 90, at 1172 n.3.
95. Id. at 1172-75. This analyst has noted three distinguishable types of possible
"state action": 1) private performance of a government function, see, e.g., Nixon v.
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for state action, the analyst in "State Action" closely scrutinizes
the Weber facts and decision, finding a labyrinthine but pervasive argument supporting his thesis that Weber involves state
action inasmuch as the government was involved through the
several named agencies. He injudiciously ignores, however, conflicting rights of minority claimants in employment discrimination contests. If such state action is present, the observer avers
that, where sufficient, it may constitute the basis for a fifth
amendment-equal protection challenge to the affirmative action
plan scrutinized in Weber.9
One could argue, however, that since half the spaces in the
Kaiser-USWA Plan are specifically reserved for whites, the program does indeed operate equally for whites. Nonetheless, the
main argument opposing a reverse discrimination position is
that the program's equality inheres in its compensatory nature:
its attempt to redress the centuries of exclusion and segregation
which have resulted in the present disadvantage of blacks.
State action arguments against affirmative action for minority advancement are misguided. Such attacks have been based
on an ahistorical analysis which obliterates the long, pervasive,
entrenched and inextricable involvement/collusion of the state
for more than three centuries in the suppression of the rights of
black people. Several periods of black history in America have
been chronicled which may contribute to a critical evaluation of
the role of blacks in American society today.
Only by historical amnesia, a purposeful forgetting of the
vital role of the state in sustaining the oppressed and exploited
position of blacks in American history and society, can such an
attack be rationalized. Such a revision of history must necessarily negate the role of the state in sustaining the African slave
slavery and the retrade, in maintaining the laws which upheld
97
turn of fugitives, and in the code noir
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); 2) judicial enforcement of a private agreement, see, e.g.,
Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); and 3) involvement sufficiently significant with the
conduct of a private defendant as to amount to "state action," see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 536 U.S. 715 (1961), Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967).
96. State Action, supra note 90, at 1175.
97. J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OP AMERICAN NEGROES 30-67,
85-119, 126-137 (4th ed. 1974) (on the institution of slavery and its nurturance of racism); R. Staples, The Black Family in Evolutionary Perspective, THE BLACK SCHOLAR,
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Such a rewriting of history would require forgetting about
the re-establishment of (white) Bourbon hegemony in the postCivil War South.9 8 This re-established dominance by whites in
the middle nineteenth century set the pattern and practice for
race relations in the South and perhaps the nation for the following hundred years. The post-slavery transformations of
blacks from slaves to migrants to urban workers9 9 must also be
blocked out of America's collective memory if the anti-minority
advancement myth of preferential treatment is to survive.
Moreover, the obliteration of the relationship of blacks to
American society would require the elimination of any recall of
the discrimination and segregations in the military service in
both World Wars, and in the racially unequal distribution of
federal sustenance during the Depression. 0 0 Continued discrimination is today evidenced by the successful discrimination suits
in employment (for back pay, unequal hiring and unequal promotion). Other evidence of contemporary racism and discrimination abounds. '10
The answer to the "state action" argument marshalled
against the affirmative action plan in Weber and similar cases
must go first and foremost to the historical context of affirmative action programs. The etiology of these programs was an attempt to remove the vestiges of the stigma of racial discrimination and domestic colonialism in this country. 0 2 Aiding victims
of historical discrimination to achieve societal parity economically, educationally or socially may be a sufficiently "compelling" state interest to pass the special scrutiny to which courts
2, 3-9 (June 1974); THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF BLACK NATIONALISM (Stuckey ed. 1972).
98. On the re-establishment of Bourbon Hegemony, see AFRO AMERICAN HISTORY:
PRIMARY SOURCES 77 et seq., 92 et seq. (Frazier ed. 1971). See also R. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO (1965).
99. For such evidence, see J. BLACKWELL, THE BLACK COMMUNITY (1975); R. HILL, THE
STRENGTHS OF BLACK FAMILIES (1972); K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO (1965); R. STAPLES, THE
BLACK FAMILY (1978); D. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1980).
100. AFRO AMERICAN HISTORY: PRIMARY SOURCES (Frazier ed. 1971).
101. See Bowen Dissertation, supra note 57, at 22 n.1.
102. For a careful documentation of racial discrimination and domestic colonialism as
background to affirmative action programs, see Bowen Dissertation, supra note 57, at
111-43. See also, Turner, The Black Community as Colony: An Argument For (1970),
Harris, The Black Community as Colony: An Argument Against (1972), and Carmichael
and Hamilton, White Power 2-32 (1972) in INTRODUCTION TO AFRO-AMERICAN STUDIES
(1978).
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subject racial classifications."0 3 Indeed, Justice Marshall and
Justice Brennan believe that it is.
It has been argued that "reverse racial discrimination" may
be constitutional:
"[S]pecial scrutiny" is not appropriate when White
people have decided to favor Black people at the expense
of White people . . . . Whites can do things to Whites
they could not do to Blacks . . . . It is not suspect in a

constitutional sense for a majority, any majority, to discriminate against itself.' 4
Note that whether majority here is understood as sociological
(read: power) or numerical, it makes little difference since in either case the controlling group decides to "prefer," i.e., compensate, others (non-controllers).
The question remains as to why it is not an equivalently
appropriate test for the Supreme Court (with a black and several white Justices) to decide that within constitutional limits,
compensatory treatment for past societal (or occupational) discrimination is in order. The role of deciding such questions is
clearly appropriate to an antimajoritarian institution such as the
Court under our constitutional scheme. As an arbiter of individual rights, the Court has increasingly seen itself as the primary
safeguard for such rights.
If one accepts the historical argument (that there was slavery of blacks in America; that historically black education was
opposed and discouraged de jure, de facto and informally with
state action-imposed hardships), then one must see "bootstrapping" as having been denied, as forbidden, because blacks never
had the "boots." In every decade, one can point to laws and social attitudes which precluded blacks from becoming part of
mainstream America.10 5 Even those who hold that only equal opportunity and not equal results is what the Constitution mandates must recognize the important role of parental socio-economic status for intergenerational mobility. That one's
grandparents or great-grandparents or ancestors (to whatever
103. Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Discrimination,11 U.
726-27 (1971).
104. Id.
105. See Bowen Dissertation, supra note 57, at 21-23 nn.l-11.

CH.
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degree) had certain opportunities means that it is more likely
than not that one comes into today's economic arena advantaged. To the degree that one's ancestors were denied opportunities, were systematically prevented (by the state) from using
or developing them, then one comes into today's market disadvantaged. Hence, when blacks have made arguments about reparations1 06 owed to blacks for contributions extorted in building
this nation, compensatory treatment in the economic sector, inter alia, may be just what they had in mind. And, what is more,
such treatment may be all that America is willing to provide in
restitution. 10 7
To be sure, the question is essentially settled when one considers the evidence of discrimination and the considerations of
"state action" which were before Congress in 1963 and 1964
when it was deliberating on the proposed Civil Rights Bill. The
evidence of discrimination which the Congressional committee
itself characterized as "overwhelming" consisted of Department
of Labor reviews of black employment over a twenty year period
and median earnings during the same time for whites compared
to blacks. 10 8 When the committee drafting the proposed bill reviewed the involvement of states and state apparatus in upholding discrimination, the support and advancement of the discriminatory treatment of minorities by private parties was found to
have been augmented and embellished by such state activity. 0 9
106. See Forman, Black Manifesto in THE CA.SE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 161-75
(Bittker ed. 1973). For a major effort by a state to make reparations to its citizens albeit
in a contemporary context, see Brown Moves to Aid Japanese-American Interned in
Wartime, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1982, at A21, col. 1. _
107. One may contemplate various alternatives: 1) cash payments based on some
formula calculating discrimination against ancestors or self; 2) preferential treatment for
a period equal to the 300-400 year period of discrimination-slavery. Other formulations
have suggested a separate nation with land in the South (five southern states, for instance); the promised "40 acres and a mule" calculated to 1985 dollars to guard against
inflation. As with any of these formulations, some observers would see a problem in determining which contemporary individuals were sufficiently victimized (through their ancestors or selves) as to require such restitution. On these and other formulations, see
BLACK SEPARATISM AND SOCIAL REALITY: Riroic
AND REASON (Hall ed. 1977).
108.

Legislative History 1964 supra note 59, at 2444, 2445 & 2459-60.

109.

Comment, The Distorted Adversarial Posture, supra note 82, at 1543 and n.5.
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VI. THE WEBER LEGACY
Weber upheld the legality of private, voluntary, race-conscious imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories. However, Weber aided the elimination of only one segment of the
most blatant variety of occupational discrimination: the conspicuous imbalance resulting from private discrimination based on
race. Hence, although it upheld affirmative action programs
designed to rectify this imbalance, Weber did not speak directly
to several other types of affirmative action programs: 1) courtordered affirmative action; 2) administratively generated affirmative action pursuant to compliance with Executive Order 11246
or EEOC guidelines; 3) affirmative action in governmental employment; or 4) affirmative action pursuant to consent decrees.
In essence, Weber did not decide what constituted a "permissible" affirmative action plan. 11 0 Nonetheless, Weber has been
cited in support of affirmative action programs in the public sector."' Most importantly, Weber did not decide what was constitutionally permissible with past proved discrimination. If affirmative action programs are theoretically designed to correct the
present effects of present and past discrimination, for a court to
act in an equitable and judicious manner the alleged discrimination must be proved sufficient to a clear and convincing standard to the satisfaction of a reasonable man. Therefore, while
Weber left undecided the most central contemporary question of
discrimination (i.e., what standard is to be applied for past
proved discrimination and what remedy pursuant to this proof),
it did provide some insight and guidelines for decisions on these
issues."'
Two commentators have emphasized the divergence of the
holdings in Weber and Bakke by pointing to the constitutional
considerations of the latter."3 The thesis may be proffered that
since Weber did not consider constitutional questions, it may be
necessary, given the homologous situation, to distinguish Bakke
quite narrowly. Contrary to the statements of these commenta110. Id.
111. See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text.
112. See note 116 infra and accompanying text.
113. Robertson and Johnson, Reverse Discrimination:Did Weber Decide the Issue?
31 LABOR L. J. 693, 696 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Robertson and Johnson].
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tors, the distinctions, that there was in Bakke a state-established quota system reserving places only for minorities as opposed to a voluntary, private, race-conscious affirmative action
program as in Weber, may be more illusory than real. Indeed, if
one considers that in Bakke evidence of actual discrimination
might have been recognized (both the institution's history of minority exclusion and the medical profession's deficiency in minority inclusion in the context of the percentage of minority
presence in California), then the omissions in Weber presented
above are all the more crucial proof of the convergence. 1 "
The significance of the Weber decision has been perhaps
best characterized metaphorically by the observer who noted
that after Weber's assault, affirmative action is like one who has
been shot at and missed. 11 5 In essence, the lower courts came
close enough with their decisions to maiming and wounding the
victim (affirmative action programs) to count as a very near
miss, so that such a program must know that it barely got away
with its life and must now stand constantly vigilant, anticipatory
of the next attempted onslaught.
Finally, the legacy of Weber is the ground rules established
by the court for reviewing affirmative action programs. One may
delineate the four Weber requirements which may serve as
guidelines for redressing racial imbalances, as proffered by Justice Brennan: 1) an affirmative action plan may not "unnecessarily trammel the interests" of white employees; 2) a plan may
not require that white workers be terminated and replaced with
black employees; 3) a plan may not "create an absolute bar" to
the advancement of white employees; 4) a plan may be only
"temporary" until racial imbalance is corrected and may not be
used only to "maintain racial balance." '
Observing that the Kaiser-Gramercy plan met all four of
these requirements, one analyst further noted that rather than
moving "too fast" to correct past inequities, the Weber plan
would, at present rates, take 30 years to achieve the 39% parity
114. See Justice Marshall's eloquent but abortive dissent in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387;
see also, amicus curiae brief by NAACP.
115. Robertson and Johnson, supra note 113, at 696.
116. 443 U.S. at 208.
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force proportions for craft positions at Kaiwith minority 1labor
7
ser-Gramercy.
These words, written in the summary of the legislative history, which now sound almost as empty platitudes, were given
serious note at the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
The United States is a nation of many peoples. The
interests of some are not always the interests of all. In
sustaining our way of life and in preserving our historic
traditions, however, the fundamental rights of each citizen must be protected, and, in order for our Nation to
maintain its role as world leader, the hopes and aspirations of minorities must always be safeguarded. The enactment of H.R. 7152,18 while by no means a panacea,
will be a significant beginning.
Every segment of American life must bear a heavy
burden in this epochal struggle. Congress must move rapidly-more rapidly than it has to date-to legislate intelligently and effectively in this critical area. The agencies
of Government must strive more actively to enforce the
law of the land. The courts-State and Federal-must
exercise greater vigilance in guarding the interests of all
the people. Each citizen must make a greater effort to
respect the dignity of his fellow man.119

VII. CONCLUSION
At its broadest, Weber held that voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative action programs for private employers are permissible under the law (Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act),
whether or not there has been a showing of prior (employer) discrimination where there has been a history of societal discrimination, either regional or occupational. The Court explicitly declined to decide either that this holding was applicable to public
sector employment or that similar standards would be applied
where there has been a bona fide showing of prior discrimination. Already, Weber has been applied by lower court judges who
cite it as collateral authority for upholding affirmative action
programs in public employment. The question remains as to
117.
118.
119.

Robertson and Johnson, supra note 113, at 697.
H.R. 7152 was the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Legislative History 1964, supra note 59, at 2518-19.
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what standard the Court will evoke when prior discrimination is
proven, either state or private.
Inasmuch as the courts are restoring intent rather than effects (or consequences) as a basis of proof in some kinds of civil
rights cases (e.g., voting cases), it should be perceptibly more
difficult to establish the necessary grounds to prevail in these
suits. Several cases1 20 suggest that the Court has begun to retrogress from the position of supporting the civil rights advances
of the Warren Years."1 While arguably these cases do not all lie
under the same constitutional clauses or statutory claims as
would Title VII cases, the perception of a change and the arguable reality of change unfavorable to affirmative action is undesirable and perhaps ominous.
While the holding in Weber is a positive step, it also reflects
a conservative expression within the Court which, on a societal
issue of such burning importance, chose to abide by the timeworn precedent of deciding issues narrowly rather than giving
clear and widely applicable guidelines to a nation highly divided
on the proper role and place for affirmative action. The Weber
legacy in its narrow decision is incongruous because all of black
history in America, i.e., much of American history, must be forgotten (obliterated) for Weber, as a narrow precedent on the social problem of employment discrimination, to stand. If affirmative action is to be a viable, workable, and effective remedy for
employment discrimination in this country, it cannot be so enervated as only to be a liquid paste of a solution when cement is
needed . . . else the entire fabric of justice in this country may

come further unraveled.

120. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982); Guardians Ass'n of the
N.Y.C. Police Dept. v. Civil Service Comm'n of N.Y.C., 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd
on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273
(1982).
121. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) which found a category of "minor" deviations in population equality requiring no justification. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980) which overturned a holding that at-large elections diluted black voting strength.
See also Pear, Courts and Lawmakers Restoring Intent as Ground for Proof of Bias,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1981, § 1, at 18, col. 1.

